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History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific
explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical
conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure
has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting
rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony
and a mystery. The mystery consists of the persistence of a complete lack of interest in efforts to
theorize historical explanation. Fundamental questions regarding why an historical account could have
any rational influence remain not merely unanswered, but unasked. The irony arises from the fact that
analytic philosophy of history went into an eclipse where it remains until this day just around the time
that the influence of Kuhn’s great work began to make itself felt. This paper highlights puzzles long
ignored regarding the challenges a work of history managed to pose to the epistemic authority of
science, and what this might imply generally for the place of philosophy of history vis-à-vis the
problems of philosophy.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of ScienceIn history . . .expectations are far less precise, and there is
correspondingly less agreement than in science about
whether expectations ‘fit the facts’ and about the sorts of data
relevant to their evaluation. . . .The historian’s problem is not
simply that the facts do not speak for themselves but that,
unlike the scientist’s data, they speak exceedingly softly.
Quiet is required if they are to be heard at all. (Kuhn, 1980,
p. 183)1. Introduction
A philosophical mystery, one cloaked by a methodological
irony, shrouds a key development in contemporary philosophy of
science. The mystery? How to account for the logic of explanation
that underwrites the influence and status of Kuhn’s widely cele-
brated and extensively studied The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(hereafter cited as SSR). What makes this a mystery? Consider the
following irony: despite SSR’s status, there exists no generally
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tion ought to possess.1 In this key respect, fifty years of debate
regarding the merits of SSR has proceeded virtually without mention
of the philosophical void regarding the topic of historical explana-
tion. Almost all readers of SSR have started this mystery in the face
for 50 years now without taking notice of or commenting on it.2
Indeed, the fact that the entire topic of historical explanation
fell off the map of (analytic) philosophy decades ago compounds
the mystery of how SSR could have been influential and the irony
of its enduring impact. Just at a moment when philosophy of
history arguably should have ‘‘taken off’’ as a core philosophical
discipline, riding a wave of professional concern one might have
expected Kuhn’s work to generate, discussion instead effectively
ceases and the topic disappears. And even those reporting ‘‘the nat-
uralists return’’ record no sightings or mentions of philosophy of
history.
In this sense, the mystery runs deep. For it has managed (or so it
seems) to elude detection even by those supposedly highly
sensitized and trained to identify, analyze, and evaluate standards
of explanation and argument. But why pursue this philosophical
cold case—the unsolved and allegedly worrisome mystery of a
philosophical topic gone missing? Why worry about the silence
that surrounds questions regarding the norms of historical expla-
nation? I suggest the following answer: breaking the silence
should prove key to exposing still existing and important questions
about the relation of history and philosophy, ones that presently go
unasked and ignored in polite philosophical company. In order to
reanimate interest in this mystery, I assemble reminders of its con-
nection to a basic task of philosophy—to clarify for ourselves the
grounds for what we take to be true, and so apparently shared
but still implicit standards for rationally warranting beliefs.
2. The rise of SSR and the disappearance of analytic philosophy
of history
Towards this end, it helps to recall how analytic philosophy of
history comes to exist as a subfield. If one were to construct a type
of genealogical chart, it would show analytic philosophy of history
as the runt of a litter of topics that sprung from philosophy of sci-
ence in its youth. Birth could plausibly be dated to coincide with1 The University of Chicago Press now has on offer a 50th anniversary edition of Structur
celebrated for his historical studies. Yet Hacking nowhere mentions issues of historical expl
his explicit acknowledgment of SSR as a work of history. (E.g., Hacking, 2012, p. x) A hint
emerges in the following remark by Hacking. ‘‘Thus I claim that Kuhn leads us into a ‘rev
historical processes whereby new categories come in to being. But I assert that a seemingly
the sciences, although brought into being at moments of time, are not historically constitu
119) Hacking’s focus on styles of scientific reasoning and processes of categorization sugg
inquiry represents nothing more than a rough analogue to a context of discovery. Styles of
analogous to a context of justification. On this view, there would then be nothing requiring
terminology) characterizable as a ‘‘style’’ of historical reasoning, at least in the sense found
Hacking takes a different view. That is, with respect to categories for human kinds, a histo
unlike laboratory phenomena. Hacking’s scattered remarks on Foucault hint strongly of thi
yet, in the so-called social and human sciences, because in those domains the distinction b
prove useful, . . .at least to grasp the interrelations of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ that literall
2 Work by Alasdair MacIntyre constitutes the sole exception of which I am aware. I discu
Kuhn’s naturalism, Bird (2012) offers in some respects a nice description of Kuhn’s philo
observing that Kuhn’s approach to the topics was ‘‘multifaceted, involving history, psyc
‘‘unusual’’ given the then prevailing norms for evaluating arguments in the empirical sc
regards philosophical consequence, are often more implied than stated explicitly.’’ (Bird, 20
of Kuhn’s argument as historical, concerns how Kuhn succeeded in challenging and overth
new facts to light; its novelty lies in its narrative structure regarding historical episodes
imagine that no one prior to Kuhn has written a history of science.
3 The story adumbrated here simplifies the picture by excluding Popper’s influential inte
science. I address below questions of how debates about historical explanation sit within
philosophers such as Peter Winch.
4 Richard Vann, who served as executive editor of History and Theory for many years, uses
Kermode: ‘‘It seems . . . that philosophy of history is the business of those who teach novels.
1950 [the hey-day of positivist debate]. In 1968 it was still avant-garde; by 1975 the proble
of history in the English-speaking world. I shall try to show how, and in what institutionathe publication of Hempel’s classic article, ‘‘The Function of Gen-
eral Laws in History.’’ (Hempel, 1942; see also Nagel, 1979[1961],
especially the chapter ‘‘Problems in the logic of historical inquiry.’’)
Hempel there stipulates as a condition for the scientific/logical
adequacy of an historical explanation that it contain a covering
law. This effectively mandates the de facto exile of academic
history from the realm of the legitimate sciences.3 Analytic philos-
ophy of history, for the 25 years following Hempel’s article, by and
large consists in critiques or defenses of the applicability of this
model to historical explanation.4
Regarding the historical/philosophical context at the point
when SSR first appears requires situating Kuhn’s work relative to
Hempel and to Quine. Reading Hempel’s classic 1950 article, ‘‘Prob-
lems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’’ along-
side of Quine’s (1951) ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’’ a striking
feature emerges. One finds in Hempel’s article (see especially §5)
not merely a recognition of the type of the holism that Quine so
(in)famously promotes, but actually an embrace. Both acknowl-
edge that holism radically broadens what counts as the unit of
empirical significance with regard to explanation and testing in
science as then philosophically conceived. Ironies abound here.
On the one hand, Hempel betrays no anxiety that holism ulti-
mately represents any principled problem for his favored analysis
of the logic of science. On the other hand, Quine hypothesizes that
holism makes it impossible to philosophically vindicate the verifi-
cation criterion of meaning at the philosophical heart of positivism.
Kuhn for his part explicitly acknowledges Quine’s critique in
‘‘Two Dogmas’’ as a key influence, particularly the holism it ushers
into philosophical prominence. (Kuhn, 2012, p. vi; see also Zammi-
to, 2004) Kuhn’s particular narrative of a history of science power-
fully illustrates how this shift in a conceptualization of the unit of
empirical significance effectively upends all prevailing accounts of
what supposedly explains the rationality of theory change in
science. And one might then imagine that precisely this turn of
events—the emergence of a narrative of the history of science that
profoundly alters and constrains any philosophical account of how
rational evaluation of scientific reasoning could proceed—would
galvanize philosophical concerns about and research into the nat-
ure of historical knowledge and historical explanation. Yet, as
Arthur Danto wryly notes, nothing of the sort happens.e (Kuhn, 2012), featuring an introduction by Ian Hacking, who himself has been justly
anation in his generally laudatory discussion of Kuhn’s work and influence and despite
of why Hacking displays no interest in questions of specifically historical explanation
olutionary nominalism’ which makes nominalism less mysterious by describing the
more radical step, literal belief in the creation of phenomena, shows why the objects of
ted. They are phenomena thereafter, regardless of what happens.’’ (Hacking, 1985, p.
ests (and here I speculate) that, at least with regard to the natural sciences, historical
reasoning and processes of categorization of natural phenomena play the role for him
anything that might be termed a ‘historical explanation’, or even anything (in Hacking’s
in the natural sciences. Regarding the human sciences (however one draws that line),
ry of how these emerge and stabilize does constitute a key part of their explanation,
s view. ‘‘I think that we shall lose ourselves in confusion and obscurity for some time
etween word and thing is constantly blurred. . . .Here Foucault’s ‘archaeology’ may yet
y constitute us as human beings.’’ (Hacking, 1985, p. 124)
ss his view below. In a review of the 50th anniversary edition that nicely emphasizes
sophical targets and how SSR addresses them. However, Bird contents himself with
hology, philosophy, and sociology,’’ a combination that he acknowledges stood as
iences. As Bird summarizes matters in this regard, ‘‘Kuhn’s arguments, especially as
12, p. 865) What Bird nowhere acknowledges, despite his recognition of key portions
rowing other extant narratives of the history of science. For it is not as if SSR brought
already known and much studied. Bird’s article might lead an uninformed reader to
rvention—The Poverty of Historicism. But Popper certainly never promoted history as a
readings of Wittgenstein propagated so influentially from the late 1950s forward by
as the epigraph for (Vann, 1995) the following statement by noted literary critic Frank
’’ Vann then observes, ‘‘Kermode’s view would have been considered bizarre indeed in
ms that such a comment raises had moved to the forefront of debate in the philosophy
l settings, this happened.’’ (Vann, 1995, p. 40)
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middle-1960s to the present. Somewhere someone sometime
in the last decade must have written about explanation, even
about historical explanation—but I cannot think of an example
offhand. . . . It is not just that the topic is under extreme neglect.
It is, rather, that there is hardly room in the present scene of
philosophy for discussion of its issues. So to find someone
actively working at them would be almost to encounter a his-
torically displaced person, like someone doing abstract expres-
sionist canvasses as if the whole subsequent history of art had
not taken place. (Danto, 1995, pp. 72–73)
The spell cast by positivism conjured analytic philosophy of history
into existence. Those caught in the magic of that moment perceived
a need to exorcise history of its possession by narrative form. But
when the positivist spell breaks, such concerns vanish.
Danto, himself a key player in philosophy of history in its prime,
identifies Kuhn as the thinker who forces philosophers of science
to rethink the philosophical role that they must accord to history.
What makes Kuhn’s work historically important is the fact that a
good many thinkers, whose worlds very largely overlapped
Hempel’s . . .were caused by Kuhn’s work to turn into thinkers
whose world overlapped Kuhn’s world instead. . . . I can remem-
ber one of them saying with a cry of anguish that he wished
Kuhn had never written that damned book. . . . [A 16th century
scholastic] said, in much the same spirit, that ‘‘The wretched
Luther had emptied the lecture halls’’. For a long period there
were questions with which scholastic thinkers dealt and with
which everyone who shared their world regarded as of the
greatest moment. And then, all at once, almost overnight,
nobody cared any longer. . . . [Hempel’s theory] just stopped
being relevant, the way the whole philosophy of history it
defined stopped being. It was replaced with a different set of
questions, a world in effect, into which it no longer fit. (Danto,
1995, pp. 84–85)5
But Danto, his sophistication with regard to this topic notwith-
standing, nonetheless never pauses to ask why philosophy of his-
tory fails to rise reborn from the ashes of positivism.
Kuhn advanced a view of history so powerful that history rather
than being an applied science, as Hempel holds history to be,
history came to be the matrix for viewing all the sciences. It
all at once became the philosophical fashion to view science
historically rather than logically, as an evolving system rather
than a timeless calculus, as something whose shifts over time
are philosophically more central to its essence than the timeless
edifice of theories. . . . (Danto, 1995, p. 72)
Hempel held that histories only offer ‘‘explanation sketches,’’
explanatorily adumbrated accounts that need to be filled out by
covering laws in order to achieve fully legitimacy as scientific expla-5 Note a concurrent observation by Vann regarding Louis Mink, a philosopher tied to H
without exaggeration that until almost 1965 the critical philosophy of history was the co
6 I have in mind Ian Hacking, particularly his important and critical works The Emerge
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), and Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA
examples.
7 Again, there is a dramatic contrast in the reception by theoretically minded historians
(1993) and Toews (1987). Apart from philosophy, those who do receive extensive discussio
White’s case) or none (so far as I know with Foucault) acknowledgment of any influence b
natural science per se, and never seems intent on bringing the sort of questions for which
precisely this on Foucault’s inspiration). This leads, in effect, to about three decades of discu
on in analytic philosophy could possibly be relevant to their interests. And it is not until
Foucauldian questions regarding the relationship between the historically available stock o
activities. Hacking himself, to add the final turn of the screw, neither self-identifies as a phi
reflection on the methods of history that he lavishes on physics or statistics. To the best of
milieu develops in this regard remains (Novick, 1988). See also Vann (1998).nations. But the de facto impact of Kuhn’s historioraphic practice
proves false Hempel’s attempt to legislate what the form of histor-
ical explanation needs to be. In short, Danto gives voice to the fact
that Kuhn’s work made passé all that prior to it had supposedly de-
fined what a science of history had to be. Yet having commented on
the surprising result of Kuhn’s work—the complete and sudden
overthrow of a powerful theory of scientific explanation by means
of a work of history that supposedly does not have even prima facie
status as a scientific explanation—and stared it in the face, Danto
(like so many other philosophers) then simply turns away.
Nonetheless, the old questions remain unanswered; the demise
of positivist hegemony in philosophy of science only removes any
felt pressure to answer them. In short, once positivist-inspired
methodological debates cease to have any real point, interest in
philosophy of history within analytic philosophy largely disap-
pears. (Vann, 1995) Ironically, then, some time just subsequent
to the publication of the first edition of SSR, i.e., as the history of
science intrudes itself into a central role in philosophical debate
regarding philosophy of science, philosophical discussion of histor-
ical explanation effectively ceases. And even as Kuhn’s work, as has
been widely noted and much discussed (see especially Zammito,
2004), gives impetus and life to a distinctive style of sociology of
science and inspires the creation of a new discipline—science stud-
ies, questions of what makes for a proper historical explanation re-
main ignored.
But note the revolution wrought in philosophy at this moment.
SSR effectively reverses the received order of epistemic authority. Prior
to Kuhn a work of history, in order to count as providing a legiti-
mate explanation, needed to conform to a certain standard deter-
mined by an ahistorical account of science. Post-Kuhn,
philosophers fashion histories to account for which explanatory
forms come to prevail and why.6 Moreover, Kuhn never receives
attention as a historiographer or a philosopher of history, even be-
fore that philosophical tribe decamps and vanishes. Indeed, his
own remarks on historical methodology prove sporadic and mostly
unilluminating.7 If analytic philosophy of history begins, for all in-
tents and purposes, with Hempel’s throwing the gauntlet down to
historians and daring them to meet the challenge posed by standards
of scientific explanation, it ironically ceases just at the point of a
miraculous reversal of fortune. Despite decades of exile from the
realm of scientific explanation, a work in the history of science over-
throws extant accounts of the rationality of theory change in science.
But how could this have happened given the absence of any accepted
basis for taking a history as explanatory?
2.1. Why Did Analytic of Philosophy Disappear?
How then to account for this lack of interest in questions regard-
ing historical explanation just at the moment when they should
have been regarded as particularly relevant and pressing? One
answer found in the literature can be considered but ultimately
rejected, Giuseppina D’Oro’s ‘‘The Ontological Backlash: Why didistory and Theory from its inception. ‘‘As he [Mink] wrote in 1974, ‘It could be said
ntroversy over the covering law model.’’’ (Vann, 1987, p. 2)
nce of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Rewriting the Soul
: Harvard University Press, 2002). But Peter Galison’s works also provide important
between the ignoring of Kuhn and the appropriation of Foucault et al. See Zammito
n for their historicizing turns, e.g., Hayden White and Michel Foucault, offer some (in
y or credit to Kuhn. Foucault’s most influential works manifest little or no interest in
he is famous into the area of scientific change (though, of course, Ian Hacking does
ssion where those interested in historiography simply assume that nothing that goes
the publication of Hacking’s key works that any analytic philosopher takes seriously
f ways of self-understanding and the implications of these for other knowledge related
losopher of history nor, more ironically still, ever exercises the sort of methodological
my knowledge, the most judicious and comprehensive account of how the intellectual
548 P.A. Roth / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013) 545–552Mainstream Analytic Philosophy Lose Interest in the Philosophy of
History?’’. (D’Oro, 2008) According to D’Oro, debate in philosophy
of history concerns the status of reasons as causes. Unfortunately,
D’Oro’s narrative runs together and confuses two distinct strands,
one emanating from a debate that chronologically predates logical
positivism but foreshadows a number of key issues.
D’Oro’s telling of the tale begins with the 19th century dispute
about the nature of explanation in the natural versus the human
sciences—Erklären v. Verstehen. This earlier strand, as formulated
by Dilthey and others,8 defends history as a science, but one
characterized by its own special methods, methods that were tai-
lored for the reconstruction of meaning structures specific to times
and places. In this context, a principled distinction between the nat-
ural and the human sciences results from the different types of
explanations that the natural as opposed to the human sciences seek
to produce—the nomothetic as opposed to the idiographic. Non-
reducibility of one science to the other here results from the fact that
the human sciences seek the particularity of situations and so cannot
generalize. The natural sciences, for their part, abstract from the
particularities of time and place in order to identify invariant regu-
larities at work. Explanations required causal laws; causal laws re-
quire invariant regularities. The friends of Verstehen denied that
idiographic accounts yielded regularities of the requisite sort. His-
tory was held to reside firmly on the human sciences/Verstehen side
of this divide. History could not be a science for this reason.
However, D’Oro attempts to weave this together with a second
strand of debate, one where Davidson famously intervenes. This in-
volves the dispute over ‘‘reasons as causes,’’ a debate that emerges
from a particular reading of the later Wittgenstein and not from
any positivist strictures on explanation. Dilthey and those in this
hermeneutic tradition defend history as a science, by which they
meant a subject that produces truths by virtue of a special method.
Those neo-Wittgensteinians who deny reasons as causes also deny
as a matter of principle the possibility of a science of the social, his-
tory included. For the neo-Wittgensteinians, reason-giving repre-
sents a normative activity, and so cannot be characterized by
mere descriptive inquiry. But idiographic does not equate to norma-
tive. In one case reason explanations prove compatible with history
being a science, in the other case not. Ironically, D’Oro mentions a
key component of the actual debate but does not recognize it for
what it is. (D’Oro, 2008, p. 405)
The problematic as configured by the Verstehen/Erklären debate
does, to be sure, change with the appearance of logical positivism
generally and Hempel’s classic paper in particular.9 The change is
this. Hempel does not insist that, e.g., economics reduce to the laws
of physics. What he does require concerns the logical form of scien-
tific explanation. D’Oro overlooks and so misses the logical concerns
of positivism and confuses them with the metaphysical views of
those alleging the conceptual autonomy of reason explanations.
D’Oro’s account thus ultimately mischaracterizes the issues at
stake. For having set the narrative line that she does, once David-
son puts to rest doubts that reasons can be causes, the issues
switch to metaphysical debates about mental causation. ‘‘My key8 Two very good historical overviews of how this debate develops and the form it takes
9 I shall follow D’Oro in using Hempel’s essay as exemplifying the logical positivist posit
might find it helpful to reference as well, e.g., Nagel (1979). Whatever some differenc
methodological unity of the sciences, and how the methodological unity entails the requir
cannot be causes.
10 A more Kuhn-centric answer to the disappearance question owes to Pinto de Oliveira, w
de Oliveira, 2012, p. 115) On this account, philosophy of history as it was disappears bec
reading of Kuhn’s texts that might readily be contested. I mention it only to note that alth
addresses none of the questions one might have regarding what makes for an adequate hi
into Kuhn.
11 Although its title suggests a strong relevance to the subject under discussion, I ignore h
Kuhn. (Kindi 2005) In addition, as I go on to develop, Kuhn’s own remarks on historiography
to Kuhn of certain corresponding ‘‘first principles.’’ Mladenovic offers a detailed and compclaim is that the declining interest in the philosophy of history is
linked to the return of a metaphysical conception of the task of phi-
losophy.’’ (D’Oro, 2008, p. 404; see also p. 405) These questions
were, in turn, appropriated by philosophy of mind. Question of
explanation within analytical philosophy of history, on her ac-
count, presuppose an account of mental causation. And those is-
sues remain unsettled. But this confuses a metaphysical question
about a type of causality and a logical question about the form of
explanation. And the logical question alone bears on norms of
explanation; the metaphysical question involves issues indepen-
dent of those of logical form.
In sum, philosophy of history does not have its disappearance
accounted for by arguing, pace D’Oro, that other areas preempted
its core issues. That earlier debate, whatever its interest, does not
call into question history’s status as a legitimate science. It ties
to later debates not via a metaphysics of causation, but in virtue
of norms of explanation specific to human sciences. What goes
missing when philosophy of history disappears involves a basis
for evaluating any imputed action explanation qua explanation,
whatever the mechanism of action.10
3. Issues regarding Kuhn’s historiography
Bojana Mladenovic offers a thoughtful account that addresses
the question of what makes for actual explanation in Kuhn’s his-
tory of science. (Mladenovic, 2007) Mladenovic examines some re-
cent extended readings of Structure from the standpoint of how
they treat Kuhn’s historiography. While sympathetic to objections
she raises to these specific works (e.g., book-length studies by
Andersen, Bird, Sharrock and Read, as well as an article by Kindi),
a particularly telling criticism she offers of Sharrock and Read bears
noting.11 On their account, the use of history in Structure has no
explanatory but only a therapeutic intent. The desired outcome on
their account would be quietist: ‘‘if philosophical therapy is success-
ful [say S & R], it will ‘leave science as it is’; history of science, not
philosophy of science, will then be the main source of understanding
of scientific development.’’ (Mladenovic, 2007, p. 267) So, if Sharrock
and Read are to be believed, the explanatory mystery goes away; in-
deed, it never existed in the first place.
Against this reading, Mladenovic makes the following pointed
response: ‘‘[P]hilosophy cannot simply ‘leave history as it is’, be-
cause history itself requires substantive philosophical assumptions
which ground the individuation of historical phenomena and the
selection of explanatory categories used in historical narratives.
History, of course, can leave these assumptions unexamined, but
that will not make them any less philosophical.’’ (Mladenovic,
2012, p. 268) In short, Sharrock and Read’s interpretation confuses
a symptom of the philosophical problem with its cause; continued
denial does not represent a good therapeutic outcome (philosoph-
ical or otherwise).
Without a doubt, Kuhn engaged in a struggle against a received
reading of the history of science, a reading that functioned very
much as an unacknowledged prop for the nascent philosophy ofwith the ascension of logical positivism are Habermas (1988) and Apel (1984).
ion. However, inasmuch as I read the essay somewhat different than does she, readers
es of detail, these works harmonize on the key point on which I insist, viz., the
ement of the use of covering laws. Neither Hempel nor Nagel ever claim that reasons
ho goes so far as to suggest that Kuhn offers a ‘‘new historiography of science.’’ (Pinto
ause replaced by a new historiography crafted by Kuhn. This odd account rests on a
ough it claims to analyze Kuhn as a historiographer, it does nothing of the sort. For it
storical explanation no matter which general view of the history of science one reads
ere Kindi’s discussion. For one, she offers no textual evidence for the view she finds in
simply cannot be reconciled with Kindi’s ‘‘transcendental’’ reading and her attribution
elling debunking of Kindi (Mladenovic, 2007, pp. 278–282).
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tory of science as one of progress—it should be noted, involves the
same absence of a philosophical base. For the received historical
account never receives any more scrutiny qua explanatory model
than does its Kuhnian alternative. But this gets ahead of the story.
Mladenovic attributes (correctly, as I shall argue) a high degree
of self-consciousness to Kuhn regarding the historiographic chal-
lenge he faced, whatever his lack of reflection on the mode of argu-
ment that history constitutes. His problem, as she notes, is that
‘‘one cannot argue against an image, or a metaphor. . . .Kuhn
couldn’t hope to be successful in erasing that image by producing
specific arguments, however sound, against particular historio-
graphical or philosophical claims and assumptions. Deeply en-
trenched images of this sort don’t just fade away when deprived
of evidence to support them, for the simple reason that images
are not supported by evidence.’’ (Mladenovic, 2012, p. 268) On this
basis, she labels Kuhn’s endeavor as metaphilosophical. This seems
apt, since Kuhn’s debate with the received view within the history
of science (and, implicitly, within the philosophy of science as
well) requires a recasting of the relationship between the history
and philosophy of science. (Mladenovic, 2012, p. 275)
Now Mladenovic has her own account of how Kuhn proposes to
‘‘support’’ (her term, Mladenovic, 2012, p. 269) his model of scien-
tific change, one she draws fromWeber’s theory of ideal types. But
as she understands them, an ideal type functions for Weber only as
‘‘a methodological tool, and its use is strictly heuristic.’’ (Mlade-
novic, 2012, p. 270) Think here of an actual Calvinist as embodying
in the flesh Weber’s ideal type of the Protestant ethic. But she then
goes to attribute ideal types a role in explanation.
Kuhn’s selection of ideal-type concepts is a reflection of his
explanatory interest: he wanted to understand what and how
science develops, and what the changes in that development
imply from a philosophical point of view. . . .Nevertheless,
‘revolution’ is an (sic) useful ideal-type concept which
accentuates incommensurability as the highly relevant feature
for our understanding of scientific change; its presence
explains rational disagreements among scientists. (Mladenovic,
2012, p. 273)
But what explanatory work could her proposed types actually pro-
vide? What would be needed to fill out her story would be an ac-
count of revolutions analogous to how the Protestant ethic helps
explain a link between actual Calvinists and a newly crafted theo-
logical license for achieving material success. Otherwise, the ideal
type heuristic offers absolutely no explanatory purchase.
Part of the way in which Mladenovic’s suggestions strains cred-
ibility here concerns the fact that Kuhnian revolutions simply do
not ‘‘explain rational disagreements among scientists.’’ Rather,
they signal precisely the point at which ‘‘rational disagreement’’
ceases to be possible. In addition (and certainly not determinative-
ly), Kuhn himself gives no evidence that he takes the term to be
more than a metaphor for the changes he hopes to characterize
(e.g., SSR 92). More importantly, while the Weberian sense of ideal
type provides explanatory insight (to the extent that it does) by
approximation of actual cases to an analytic ideal, Kuhn simply
has no ideal type of revolution on offer with respect to which ac-
tual cases can be illuminated. Rather, and not unlike those who
unwittingly or not instigate such changes in theoretical views, he
finds himself groping for a language which will allow others to
see accepted facts in new ways. The novelty of SSR, in short, does
not reside in Kuhn’s application of social science to the history of
science, but precisely in recasting relatively well-known historical
data into a very different narrative structure.12 See especially Quine (1969) and Friedman (1993, 2002).Paul Hoyningen-Huene voices a concern that more closely con-
nects to themes of central concern in this paper when he states
that he wants ‘‘only to show that and how the sociology and phi-
losophy of science are dependent on the history of science. The up-
shot is: the history of science already determines, among other
things, the realm of questions that can, in a sociological or philo-
sophical perspective, be sensibly asked with respect to science.’’
(Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, p. 490) However, Hoyningen-Huene also
records without comment a clear tension in Kuhn’s account at pre-
cisely this point. For, as he characterizes Kuhn’s discussion of the
received historiography, Kuhn maintains that ‘‘we were possessed
by a deceptive image of science’’ and that the challenge becomes
one of understanding (again speaking for Kuhn) ‘‘how can we gain
an undistorted image of past science’’. (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, p.
489) But if the philosophy and sociology of science presuppose the
history, then what marks a history of science as being of the requi-
site ‘‘undistorted’’ sort?
Just here Hoyningen-Huene’s account fails to be on Kuhn’s be-
half sufficiently self-reflexive (just as Kuhn himself turns out to
be). For Hoyningen-Huene notes that, with regard to the rationality
of theory choice, the cognitive values in play themselves turn out
to be artifacts of a scientist’s historical situation. What else could
they be? Hoyningen-Huene suggests that just here Kuhn follows
Hempel insofar as it ‘‘seems to me that Hempel and Kuhn agree
on the possibility of a justification of cognitive values, and perhaps
also on the fundamentals of the means of justification.’’ (Hoynin-
gen-Huene, 1992, p. 497) But what could this means be? Certainly
not by an abstraction of scientific method from the practice of sci-
ence. Indeed, logical positivism just was a program predicated on
this idea, and this in turn tied to accounts of logic that themselves
did not prove out.12 In short, no good reason exists for taking as free
of historical determination those norms of science that philosophers
hold near and dear.
Hoyningen-Huene notes, in fact, just this concern, but only ap-
pears to hold science accountable to it.
What I find most fascinating about this approach is the prospect
of a solution of a related problem in which sociological and
philosophical aspects are also intertwined. It is the problem of
the change of cognitive values in time, and of their difference
in different scientific communities at the same time. Kuhn has
described change and difference of cognitive values, but I think
he has not answered the question how change and difference of
cognitive values can be understood. (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992,
p. 497)
Indeed, as Hoyningen-Huene explicitly recognizes, ‘‘the question
arises how this change of values can be understood as a conse-
quence of theory change, and whether such a change may count
as justified. The latter question asks whether this sort of value
change may be rational.’’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, p. 498) Ironi-
cally, he then goes on to suggest that the metaphilosophical is-
sue—the rationality of value change, can be answered by
examining the goal(s) of science! ‘‘Thus, how should theory change
justify value change? The puzzle dissolves once one pays attention
to the fact that cognitive values relate to the ultimate goal of science
which was, in Hempel’s words, ‘an increasingly comprehensive, sys-
tematically organized, world view that is explanatory and predic-
tive’.’’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, p. 498) But now his whole
explanatory move has collapsed back on itself.
The problem began as one of the history of science predeter-
mining what questions it made philosophical sense to ask. But
when asked what to count as an ‘‘undistorted’’ view of the history
of science, the answer on offer turns out to be one that a prior
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what counts as ‘science’. This conflicts with a lesson from Kuhn
that all accept, viz., that what to count as science has no histori-
cally stable boundaries. So Hoyningen-Huene’s answer proves no
answer at all. It simply restates the problem with which he began.
In accord with a previously noted point from Danto, Hoyningen-
Huene also finds in Kuhn an ambivalence about embracing the role
for history he so famously forges. Indeed, in his book that so closely
examines the details of SSR, Hoyningen-Huene characterizes
Kuhn’s procedure in SSR explicitly in terms of the construction of
a narrative. (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 20) He there also intro-
duces two notions that underline the problematic character of
the very nature of the history he goes on to so carefully explore,
what he terms ‘‘narrative’’ and ‘‘pragmatic’’ relevance. ‘‘The mo-
ment of narrative relevance selects for material which must be ta-
ken into account if the resulting text is to be a proper
narrative. . . .Finally, the moment of pragmatic relevance selects
for material without which the pragmatic goal of a historical nar-
rative cannot be realized. Thus the content of a historical narrative
is determined in part by the audience to which it is addressed and
in part by the effect it is meant to have on this audience.’’ (Hoyn-
ingen-Huene, 1993, p. 14; see also Hoyningen-Huene, 2012, pp.
282–283) But this says nothing about the critical issues regarding
what makes for a ‘‘proper narrative’’ and the notion of ‘‘audience’’
to whom to give the explanation.13
4. Kuhn, MacIntyre, and Mink on historical explanation
Kuhn himself also characterizes a history as a narrative. In one
of the very few places he directly addresses this topic, he offers the
following gloss on the notion of a narrative explanation:
The final product of most historical research is a narrative, a
story, about particulars of the past. In part it is a description
of what occurred. . . . Its success, however, depends not only on
accuracy but also on structure. The historical narrative must
render plausible and comprehensible the events it describes.
In a sense to which I shall later return, history is an explanatory
enterprise, yet its explanatory functions are achieved with
almost no recourse to explicit generalizations. (I may point
out here, for later exploitation, that when philosophers discuss
the role of covering laws in history, they characteristically draw
their examples form the work of economists and sociologists,
not of historians. In the writings of the latter, lawlike general-
izations are extraordinarily hard to find.) (Kuhn, 1977, p. 5)
This remark could hardly be more explicit in rejecting the then pre-
vailing Hempelian account of explanation as descriptive of or pre-
scriptive for historical work. Yet it also unabashedly endorses
history as an ‘‘explanatory enterprise,’’ one built on narrative struc-
ture. ‘‘But I do claim that, however much laws may add substance to
an historical narrative, they are not essential to its explanatory
force. That is carried . . .by the facts the historian presents and the
manner in which he juxtaposes them.’’ (Kuhn, 1977, p. 16) But what
marks some ‘‘manner’’ of juxtaposition as explanatory?
Kuhn states in his ‘‘Preface’’ to The Essential Tension with regard
to this essay that this ‘‘lecture itself can be read as an effort to deal
in somewhat greater depth with the issues already introduced in
the preface.’’ (Kuhn, 1977, p. xiv) Presumably this includes the
point he makes in that very paragraph, viz., that the interest now13 Hoyningen-Huene glosses ‘‘narrative relevance’’ as the process of selecting ‘‘for materia
material includes those facts by which a historical report gains the narrative continuity t
(Hoyningen-Huene, 2012, p. 282) But he has nothing of theoretical moment to say about
14 Lest it be thought that the considerations just rehearsed represent some passing phase o
in 1980, he approvingly cites his 1968 essay as expressive of his view on the relation bet
15 Mink’s 1966 work only hint at views that he will later develop, most notably in his 1shown by philosophers of science in history ‘‘has so far largely
missed what I take to be the central philosophical point: the funda-
mental conceptual readjustment required of the historian to recap-
ture the past or, conversely, of the past to develop toward the
present.’’ (Kuhn, 1977, p. xiv) And this in turn needs to be juxta-
posed to his cryptic remark, a few pages prior to the one just
quoted, that ‘‘In history, more than in any other discipline I know,
the finished product of research disguises the nature of the work
that produced it.’’ (Kuhn, 1977, p. x) Indeed, he clearly suggests
that the finished product’s disguise consists of the narrative form
created by the historian, a form that itself does not reside ‘‘in’’
the world.
I have elsewhere argued that the cognitive content of the phys-
ical sciences is in part dependent on the same primitive similar-
ity relation between concrete examples, or paradigms, of
successful scientific work. . . .Here I am suggesting that in his-
tory that obscure global relationship carries virtually the entire
burden of connecting fact. If history is explanatory . . . it is
because the reader who says, ‘‘Now I know what happened,’’
is simultaneously saying, ‘‘Now it makes sense;. . . .what was
for me previously a mere list of facts has fallen into a recogniz-
able pattern.’’ I urge that the experience he reports be taken
seriously. (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 17–18)
At this point, it would be germane to note that the only reference
found in Kuhn’s oeuvre to a card-carrying philosopher of history oc-
curs in this essay. Kuhn makes approving reference to a 1966 essay
by Louis Mink, ‘‘The Autonomy of Historical Understanding.’’ And
although he does not do more than mention the essay in passing,
the points just made clearly bear Mink’s stamp.14
This essay by Mink appears early in what became a series of
very distinguished writings on this topic.15 It would be a hermeneu-
tic folly to read later Mink into early Kuhn. However, that said, it re-
mains the case that Mink’s 1966 remarks on the forms of ‘‘synoptic
judgment’’ define for him (and by implication for Kuhn) what makes
historical reasoning the sort of reasoning it is. Mink emphasizes the
sense in which, as he puts it, historical conclusions are ‘‘non-detach-
able.’’ This he identifies as the key factor differentiating the relation-
ship that histories bear to their evidence and structuring narratives
as opposed to evidence relation for in explanations in the sciences.
But despite the fact that an historian may ‘‘summarize’’ conclu-
sions in his final chapter, it seems clear that these are seldom or
never detachable conclusions; not merely their validity but
their meaning refers backward to the ordering of evidence in
the total argument. The significant conclusion, on might
say, . . .are represented by the narrative order itself. As ingredient
conclusions they are exhibited rather than demonstrated. (Mink,
1987, pp. 61–88)
‘‘Synoptic judgment’’ orders and structures the narrative, but the
judgment cannot be supported or elucidated independently of the
narrative that exhibits it. The narrative constitutes, in this specific
sense, its own unique pattern of justificatory argument.
Given the reference to Mink that precedes his discussion of this
points, I suggest that Kuhn can be read as endorsing this notion of
synoptic judgment when he remarks, ‘‘Theories, as the historian
knows them, cannot be decomposed into constituent elements
for purposes of direct comparison either with nature of with each
other . . . . For the historian, therefore, or at least for this one,l which must be taken into account if the resulting text is to be a proper narrative. Such
hat it needs . . .or facts which make plausible what would otherwise be implausible.’’
what makes for a ‘‘proper’’ or ‘‘plausible’’ narrative.
f Kuhn’s thought that he later disowns, note that in a biting review essay he publishes
ween the history and the philosophy of science. See Kuhn (1980, p. 183, fn. 1).
978 piece, ‘‘Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument.’’
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19–20) Now although talking about scientific theories, these re-
marks come at the conclusion of his Minkian speculations about
the nature of historical explanation, and in what the autonomy
of such historical explanation consists.
The familiar Kuhnian story about theory-ladenness, in short, ap-
plies not just to accounts of Aristotle’s physics, but characterizes as
well the narrative structure historian deploy in trying to make this
physics comprehensible to a later audience. In the penultimate
paragraph of his essay, Mink puts his view this way:
I have tried . . . to ask whether ‘‘history’’ differs from ‘‘science,’’
not because it deals with different kinds of events and not
because it uses models of explanation which differ from . . . the
received model of explanation in the natural sciences, but
because it cultivates the specialized habit of understanding
which converts congeries of events into concatenations, and
emphasizes and increases the scope of synoptic judgment in
our reflection on experience.
Now synoptic judgment is not a substitute for a methodology,
any more than ‘‘empathy’’ is a substitute for evidence; . . .So
far it is only an attempt to identify what distinguishes sophisti-
cated historical thinking from both the everyday explanations
of common sense and the theoretical explanations of natural
science. (Mink, 1987, p. 88)
Nothing here, of course, functions to unpack what Mink indicates as
the mark of ‘‘sophisticated historical thinking.’’
But in an essay published shortly after the one Kuhn cites, Mink
adds a point of significance to understanding the respects in which
a finished narrative disguises its explanatory intent. In a typical
history, unlike a novel, the reader knows in advance (more or less)
how the story turns out. The historian’s craft consequently does
not consist in surprising the reader with twists of plot or nuances
of character development. Rather, it manifests what Mink comes to
call a ‘‘configurational’’ mode of understanding, i.e., the signifi-
cance of an historian’s ‘‘emplotment’’ of the facts into narrative
form. In this respect, Mink thus comes to argue, narratives ‘‘are
in an important sense primary and irreducible. They are not imper-
fect substitutes for more sophisticated forms of explanation and
understanding. . . .Stories are not lived but told. . . .There are hopes,
plans, battles, and ideas, but only in retrospective stories are hopes
unfulfilled, plans miscarried, battles decisive, and ideas semi-
nal. . . . [B]ut it is from history and fiction that we learn how to tell
and understand stories, and it is that stories answer questions.’’
(Mink, 1987, p. 60)16 Alasdair MacIntyre, who shares Mink’s appre-
ciation of the primacy of narrative structure in matters related to
historical understanding, finds in Mink’s and Kuhn’s account his
own special set of worries. Interestingly, these bear comparison to
Kuhn’s own later concerns arising from the sociology of science that
sprang from certain readings of SSR. For the stress on the primacy of
narrative threatens, in MacIntyre’s pungent phrase, to fate Kuhn to
being ‘‘the Kafka of the history of science.’’ (MacIntyre, 1980, p. 73)17
But not everyone shares MacIntyre’s worries here about the
autonomy of narrative structure as a form of understanding. Norton
Wise, himself a distinguished historian of science, claims that the
‘‘autonomy of written language [makes it] . . .a vehicle of critical
reflection and creative imagination. This is as true in history and
in science as it is in literature . . . their creative function reflects in
part, I will argue, the capacity to support narrative of particular16 A related appreciation of the primacy narrative, though cast in a more critical tone fo
17 Virtually alone among philosophers, MacIntyre has consistently raised issues of SSR as a
to account for SSR as rationally persuasive. See especially MacIntyre (1980, 1985). I have
Mink’s views to his.
18 With regard to Kuhn’s impact on and uptake by academic historians outside the sp
thoughtful and interesting utilization of Kuhn’s account as a format for examining changekinds about the objects of science. The narratives take on different
forms in different areas and they change over time.’’ (Wise, 2011,
p. 351) Indeed, Wise goes on to complain that with respect to phys-
ics the ‘‘deductive structuring of the course of events has long de-
fined what constituted an explanation in physics. The explanatory
emphasis, however, has been on the deduction, to the exclusion of
the attached narrative, and with that, the exclusion of anything like
historicity in explanation.’’ (Wise, 2011, p. 355) He references in the
course of this article Hempel’s critique of historical explanation, but
like Kuhn did decades ago, dismisses it because it ‘‘does little to illu-
minate hownarratives are related to explanations in natural science
that do not depend on general laws.’’ (Wise, 2011, p. 371)Moreover,
although mentioning in a footnote what he terms Kuhn and Han-
son’s ‘‘historicizing ‘revolution’’’ against the Hempelian model, he
goes on to complain (unfairly, I would say) that this revolution
‘‘did not stress science as narrative, nor did it attack deduction as
explanation.’’ (Wise, 2011, p. 371 fn. 16) Alas, Wise’s own acquain-
tance with contemporary philosophy of history, at least as he re-
cords it in this piece, proves spotty at best and offers him no
apparent resources to address what makes narratives explanatory
even on the assumption (that I share) that they are.
My goal has been just to raise puzzles and questions that have
oddly gone so long unasked and unexamined despite the massive
influence narratives exert on how core issues in philosophy come
to be understood. In this respect, the foregoing reflections only
echo and elaborate frustrations voiced by John Zammito. ‘‘[W]hat
seem to be lacking here is recognition that the problems of validity
the philosophers stress in their theories about natural science ap-
ply with equal force to the utterly fallible, ineluctably empirical en-
deavor of history.’’ (Zammito, 2004, p. 100)18 A willed blindness to
this influence of history on philosophical thought also caught Ste-
phen Toulmin’s attention more than four decades ago: ‘‘In both
sociological theory and philosophy of science . . .questions about his-
torical change were set aside at the turn of the century, in reaction
against the historicism of the German idealist tradition and against
the misconceived ‘evolutionism’ of Spencer and his successors. What
we now have to do it to take up the discussion once again at the
point where it broke off some 60 years ago.’’ (Toulmin, 1971, p. 63)
By Toulmin’s calculation, analytic philosophy has passed the century
mark in its refusal to reengage with these issues. Yet like the return
of the repressed, unacknowledged historiographic issues continue to
manifest themselves, haunting and hampering efforts to evaluate
what to count as rational because of an ongoing refusal on the part
of philosophers to examine just how works of history exert their
undeniable power and influence. Kuhn’s example enduringly albeit
ironically testifies to the hold that narratives exercise even on the
philosophical imagination. Philosophical therapy (like other forms)
can commence only by first admitting to and then attempting to
comprehend the sources of this grip. As philosophers world-wide
do homage to the 50th anniversary of the publication of Kuhn’s
rightly celebrated book, surely the time has also come to also con-
front the detrimental effects of the discipline’s strategy of denial
with regard to the historiography of SSR.
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